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STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, and UTAH STATE 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO. 20040405 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a), by virtue of its August 5, 2004 Order, granting plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari ("Cert. Petition"). 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
The singular issue for this Court to address is as follows: 
Did the court of appeals correctly hold that defendants are entitled to battery 
immunity under section 63-30-10(2) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
even though the battery was committed by a mentally incompetent person? 
This is the sole issue that was determined by the court of appeals. A copy of the 
court of appeals' Memorandum Decision, dated March 18, 2004, with paragraph numbers 
added, is attached to plaintiffs' brief. Defendants will likewise cite to those paragraph 
numbers. 
Although the Cert. Petition only addressed this one issue, plaintiffs' brief 
addressed two other issues. The Court, in an October 12, 2004 Order, granted 
defendants' motion to strike those portions of plaintiffs' brief. Accordingly, the only 
remaining issue on appeal is whether a mentally incompetent person is capable of 
committing a battery under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act."). 
Standard of Review: 
On reviewing a court of appeals' decision that affirms the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals rather than 
that of the trial court, and . . . review[s] the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness. Additionally, because the paramount issue in this case is a question of 
statutory construction, it is a question of law that [the Court] review[s] for correctness." 
Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ^ j 8, 52 P.3d 1252 (citations omitted); see also Coulter & 
Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) ("Review on certiorari is limited to 
examining the court of appeals' decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised 
in the petitions.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4).) 
Moreover, whether plaintiffs' claim falls within the assault or battery exception to the 
general waiver of governmental immunity for negligence claims "is a question of law to 
be reviewed for correctness." Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1994). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (2001).1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts Taken From Plaintiffs' Complaint* 
This case arises out of an attack on the plaintiff, Tracy Wagner, by a patient of the 
Utah State Development Center ("USDC"). Plaintiff described this attack in her 
Complaint as follows: 
Plaintiff Tracy D. Wagner was doing business at the K-Mart store located at 175 
North West State Road in American Fork, Utah on October 16, 2001, at 
approximately 12:30 p.m., and was standing in line with others at the customer 
service desk near the front of the store. Unknown to Tracy D. Wagner, a patient of 
the Utah State Development Center was in the store somewhere behind her. The 
patient became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the head and hair, and threw her 
to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily injury 
to her. 
1
 Appellants have cited to the successor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101, et 
seq. That statute, however, does not govern this case because the accident in this matter 
occurred prior to July 1, 2004. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101. 
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R. 4, |^ 8 (emphasis added). 
The patient, Sam Giese, was a 28-year-old, mentally retarded man (R. 4, % 10; 49). 
At the time, Mr. Giese was in the custody of USDC and was taken on a trip to a K-Mart 
store as part of his treatment; employees of USDC were present in the K-Mart with Mr. 
Giese (R. 3, ^  15). Plaintiffs claim USDC was negligent in not preventing the attack (R. 
5-1) and seek damages for the resulting injuries to Tracy Wagner (R. 3-2); her husband, 
Robert Wagner, asserts a claim for loss of consortium (R. 2, f 21). 
USDC operates under the Utah Department of Human Services, Division of 
Services for People with Disabilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-5-101, et. seq. (1997). 
The Department of Human Services is an agency of the State of Utah. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-1-101, et seq. (1997). There is no dispute that all defendants are 
governmental entities (R. 49). 
Although defendants admit Mr. Giese's mental incompetence, they disagree with 
plaintiffs' assertion in their "Statement of Facts" that due to his mental deficiency, he 
"lacked sufficient understanding or capacity to be responsible, as a matter of law, for 
breaching any standard of care relating to any negligent or intentional tort." Aplt. Br. at 
3-4. That is not a fact, but rather is a legal conclusion that is not legally relevant, as 
discussed below. 
B. Proceedings in the Trial Court. 
On July 25, 2002, plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this matter (R. 5-1). The 
Complaint set forth a claim for relief based on the alleged negligence of USDC in failing 
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"to properly supervise the activity of" a mentally incompetent patient within its care (R. 
4, T| 11). Based upon the allegations of the Complaint, defendants moved to dismiss the 
Complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that plaintiffs5 injuries 
arose out of a battery, thereby entitling the defendants to immunity, as a matter of law, 
under the assault or battery exception to the waiver of immunity for negligence claims. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (R. 25-24, 38-26).2 After the matter was fully briefed 
(R. 50-39; 61-51) and argued (R. 69), the trial court issued a Ruling granting the Rule 12 
motion (R. 72-71). The trial court concluded that the allegations of plaintiffs' 
Complaint reflected that Mr. Giese's contact was done with "deliberate" intent and thus 
constituted a battery (R. 71.) Therefore, the court held plaintiffs' "action is barred by the 
Governmental Immunity Act." Id. The trial court's distinction between deliberate and 
accidental acts incorporates the standard of intent recognized by this Court in 1996: 
whether the actions were done with an "inten[t] to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with" another. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503, n. 3 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added.) 
C. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court decision (R. 86). On appeal, plaintiffs argued 
that battery requires proof of both an intent to make a harmful or offensive contact and an 
intent to cause harm, which they argue is synonymous with the concept of a culpable 
2
 As it is undisputed that Mr. Giese did contact the plaintiff, the State will refer to 
this attack as a battery, and the immunity as "battery immunity" rather than "assault and 
battery immunity" as it has been identified in other cases. 
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mental state. See Court of Appeals Reply Brief of Appellants, Arguments I & II . 
Defendants maintained that only proof of intent to cause a "contact" was required; in 
other words, that the mental ability of an assailant to intend and appreciate harm was 
legally irrelevant. 
Following appellate briefing, and without oral argument, the court of appeals 
issued a Memorandum Decision, on March 18, 2004, affirming the district court's order 
of dismissal. Wagner v. Utah Dept. Human Servs., 2004 UT App 70. In so doing, the 
court of appeals, like the trial court, recognized, albeit implicitly, that based on the 
allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint, assailant's actions met the requisite level of intent-
i.e., an intent to make contact - thereby making a distinction between deliberate and 
accidental conduct (id. at |^ 8) and rejecting a test based on whether the assailant had an 
intent to cause harm. Id. at fflf 4-9. The standard applied by the court of appeals is the 
same standard adopted by this Court in Tiede, which requires an intent "to cause an 
offensive or harmful contact with" another. Tiede, 915 P.2d at 503. The court of appeals 
spent much of its decision addressing, and rejecting, the plaintiffs' argument that 
"incompetent people are incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit an 
intentional tort." Wagner, 2004 UT App. at ^ 4. 
D. Proceedings on Certiorari. 
On May 19, 2004, plaintiffs filed their "Cert. Petition." Defendants filed their 
responsive brief on June 21, 2004, and plaintiffs filed a reply brief on July 1, 2004. In 
their Cert. Petition, plaintiffs raised only one issue - whether an assailant's mental 
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competence was relevant to determining the intent required to constitute a battery - the 
same issue on which the court of appeals based its decision. On August 5, 2004, this 
Court granted the Cert. Petition. 
Appellants filed their Appeal Brief on September 21, 2004. Even though the Cert. 
Petition addressed only the intent issue, appellants raised two new substantive legal issues 
in their brief. The new issues comprised a majority of appellants' opening brief and 
sought to overturn established precedent of this Court. Moreover, neither of the new 
issues was addressed by the court of appeals in its decision.3 Accordingly, on September 
29, 2004, defendants filed a motion to strike the two new arguments; the plaintiffs filed a 
response on October 6, 2004. On October 12, 2004, this Court entered an Order granting 
the motion to strike. Accordingly, plaintiffs' second and third "Issues Presented" are not 
before the Court, and Argument Sections III and IV (found on pages 16-37 of Appellants' 
Brief) have been stricken. Thus, defendants will address the only issue remaining before 
this Court - i.e., whether the defendants are entitled to battery immunity when the battery 
was committed by a mentally incompetent person. 
3
 The two new issues, which were discussed in Argument sections III and IV of 
the Appellants' Brief, addressed: 1) the scope of the "arises out o f language of § 63-30-
10 of the Immunity Act; and 2) whether assault and battery immunity applies when the 
assailant is not a governmental employee. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case arises out of a violent attack upon plaintiff Tracy Wagner, in which she 
was taken by the hair and thrown to the ground. Because the attack constituted a battery, 
defendants, all of whom are governmental entities, are immune from suit pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(2). 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that if the attack had been committed by a mentally 
competent person, their claims would be barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
Rather, plaintiffs argue that because the attack in this case was committed by a mentally 
retarded man, section 63-30-10(2) does not apply, purportedly because the assailant 
lacked the mental capacity to intend to cause harm. 
Plaintiffs' argument misperceives the elements of battery. This Court has stated 
that a battery occurs if someone acts with the intent "to cause a harmful or offensive 
contact with the person of the other." Tiede, 915 P.2d at 503, n. 3 (citing Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 13 (emphasis added)). An intent to cause harm, or a mental ability to 
appreciate that harm would result, is not required. The court of appeals properly 
considered the issue and held that the episode described in the Complaint did constitute a 
battery. The court of appeals did not, as plaintiffs suggest, eliminate the intent element. 
Rather, the court of appeals determined that the intent element is satisfied by a deliberate 
intent to cause contact, rather than an intent to cause harm. 
Plaintiffs continue to argue that, in addition to an intent to engage in contact, there 
must also be an intent to cause harm, which, they argue, raises the question of whether 
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the assailant had the mental capacity to appreciate that harm would result. Plaintiffs' 
position, however, is not supported by the Immunity Act or by relevant case law. In fact, 
this Court has upheld battery immunity where the battery was committed by a person who 
was mentally deficient. See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
In contrast to this Court's holdings in Tiede and Higgins, plaintiffs rely almost 
exclusively on a 1980 non-Immunity Act case, Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 
1980). Defendants ask the Court to rule that in light of Tiede, the holding from Matheson 
is inapplicable to this case, and that the Restatement standard adopted in Tiede applies to 
define the intent element required to constitute a battery under section 63-30-10(2). 
Defendants' position is supported by the plain language of the statute, the common 
law of this state, and federal case law interpreting the analogous Federal Tort Claim Act. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained below, plaintiffs' injuries all arise out of a 
battery entitling each of the defendants to governmental immunity. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD DEFENDANTS 
IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURY ARISING OUT OF A 
BATTERY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(2). 
A. Battery Immunity Was Correctly Applied in this Case Based on the 
Plain Meaning of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This Court takes a three-step approach to determine whether a governmental entity 
is immune from claims of negligence under the Immunity Act. The first step is to decide 
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whether the activity involved is a governmental function which is entitled to blanket 
immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. The second step is to determine whether a 
different section of the Act waives immunity. The final step is to decide whether there is 
an exception to the waiver which acts to preserve immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10 (2001). Ledfors v. Emory County Sch. DisL, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). 
Plaintiffs agree that for purposes of this appeal, the first two steps have been met and so 
this Court need only address the third step. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 sets forth the various circumstances under which there 
are exceptions to the State's waiver of immunity, i.e., where the State retains its 
immunity. These exceptions include the circumstance where a plaintiffs injuries arise 
out of a battery. In relevant part, that statute provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights[.] 
Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-10(2) (2001) (emphasis added). 
When interpreting this statute, this Court "first look[s] to the statute's plain 
language, and give[s] effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous." 
Blackner v. Dept. of Tramp., 2002 UT 44, ^ 12, 48 P.3d 949. Furthermore, "the plain 
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language of section 63-30-10(2) immunizes the State against a negligence action if 'the 
injury arises out of assault or battery." Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502. 
Under the statute, immunity lies for any claim that arises out of any battery. In 
fact, this Court has broadly and consistently granted immunity to governmental entities 
for injuries that arise out of assaults or batteries. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 
P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) (barring a claim against a school district by a child pushed into a 
window by another student while at school); Tiede, 915 P.2d 500 (barring claims against 
the State in an action brought by the family members of two women who were shot and 
killed by walkaways from a state-owned halfway house); Malcolm, 878 P.2d 1144 
(barring a claim brought by a sexual assault victim against the State for having paroled 
the assailant); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993) (barring claims against the State 
School for the Deaf and Blind for hiring a cab driver who molested a student); Higgins, 
855 P.2d 231 (barring a claim by a ten-year-old girl who was stabbed by a Salt Lake 
County Mental Health mental patient); Petersen v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 855 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1993) (barring a claim by a spectator at a basketball game arising out of a fight 
with the game announcer); Ledfors, 849 P.2d 1162 (barring a claim against a school 
district by a student who was beaten by two other students while in school). 
In interpreting this statute, this Court has not endorsed any exceptions not clearly 
expressed in the statute. In fact, the Court has refused to adopt an exception based on 
whether an assailant was a governmental employee: "Because it is the negligence of the 
governmental employee upon which any claim of liability must rest, it would make no 
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sense to engraft upon that waiver a limitation based upon the status of the assailant/' 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240. See also Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163-64. Similarly, the mental 
competence of the assailant should make no difference. 
B. Immunity Under Section 63-30-10(2) Applies Even Where a Battery Is 
Committed by a Mentally Incompetent Person. 
In fact, this Court has applied battery immunity in at least one case, despite the 
mental incompetence of the assailant. In Higgins, this Court unanimously upheld 
immunity arising out of the stabbing of a ten-year old girl by a patient of Salt Lake 
County Mental Health. The patient claimed that she "heard voices telling her 'to stab 
someone"5 which led to the stabbing. 855 P.2d at 234. This Court applied battery 
immunity to bar plaintiffs claims for injuries arising out of the stabbing, even though the 
assailant was found "guilty and mentally ill" of felony charges stemming from the attack 
(id.) and "had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain dysfunction 
and marginal intelligence." Id. at 233. Despite the patient's mental illness, the Court held 
that plaintiffs injuries "all stem from a battery." Id. at 241. 
A year later, in Malcolm, this Court, again unanimously, reiterated its holding from 
Higgins. Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1147. In Malcolm, the State was alleged to have failed to 
protect the plaintiff from a parolee who sexually assaulted her after he was released. 
Although that case did not involve a mentally deficient assailant, the Court referenced the 
Higgins decision, and focused on the patient's mental illness: 
We held [in Higgins] that the defendants were immune from suit under the assault-
and-battery exception in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). We did so despite the fact 
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that the patient was found "guilty and mentally ill" of attempted criminal homicide 
Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1147 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the court of appeals in Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah 
App. 1994), upheld immunity despite the assailant's "questionable mental condition." Id. 
at 384. The Wright court held: "Nothing in the [Immunity] Act or in our case law 
indicates that the distinction [plaintiff] champions [relating to the mental competence of 
the assailant] was contemplated by the legislature to determine whether immunity exists 
under section 63-30-10(2). The focus is on the result, not the circumstances leading 
thereto." Id. at 387. 
Utah's appellate courts have recognized that the mental status of an assailant is not 
legally relevant to an analysis under section 63-30-10(2). There is no reason to stray from 
this well-established law in the present case. This Court should uphold immunity, despite 
the mental incompetence of the assailant. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR 
DETERMINING INTENT TO COMMIT A BATTERY UNDER THE 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. The Court of Appeals Implicitly Relied on the Correct Intent Standard. 
In its decision, the court of appeals concluded that the attack at issue was a battery 
and then examined whether there should be an exception due to the mental incapacity of 
the assailant. The court of appeals implicitly agreed with defendants' position that the 
intent required to constitute a battery is the intent to cause contact with another, not the 
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more rigorous standard advocated by plaintiffs, i.e., the intent to cause harm. 
Defendants' position is the Restatement standard - the standard this Court adopted in 
Tiede - which also involved the application of assault or battery immunity. 
In Tiede, two assailants murdered their victims, and the Court held that those 
attacks fell within the common law definitions of the torts of "assault" and "battery." 
Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502-03. The Court adopted the standards set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, §§ 13, 21 (1965), under which the pivotal issue is whether the actor 
"intend[ed] to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other." Id. at 
503, n. 3 (emphasis added). In other words, under Tiede, all that is required to commit 
the intentional tort of battery is the intent to make contact with another, not the intent to 
cause harm to another. This standard distinguishes between contacts that are deliberate 
(which rise to the level of an intentional tort) and those that are accidental (which rise 
only to the level of negligence.) If the contact was intended, it matters not whether the 
assailant had an intent to cause harm or an ability to comprehend and appreciate that 
harm would result. In fact, comment c to Section 13 of the Restatement provides: "If an 
act is done with the intention described in this Section, it is immaterial that the actor is not 
inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to injure him." Restatement 
(Second) Torts, § 13, comment c. 
While the Restatement does use the words "offensive" and "harmful," those terms 
modify the term "contact" and are used in the disjunctive. Those terms merely help to 
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ensure that only injurious or offensive contacts are actionable, and to distinguish between 
harmful and offensive contact, as in present in this case, and intentional contact that is 
neither offensive nor harmful; they do not require an intent to harm. Examples of the 
latter would include intentional contact in a sporting event, or intentional contact that is 
welcome. In those cases, the contact is neither harmful nor offensive, and is thus not 
actionable. The contact in the present case, however, is both offensive and harmful. 
In their Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Giese "became violent, took Tracy 
D. Wagner by the head and hair, and threw her to the ground and otherwise acted in such 
a way as to cause serious bodily injury to her" (R. 4, f 8.) The plain language of the 
Complaint reflects an unmistakable intent by Mr. Giese to make physical contact with 
Ms. Wagner. That attack was deliberate, not accidental. It was also harmful and 
offensive. Based on the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint, the attack by Sam Giese met 
the definition of a battery recognized under section 63-30-10(2) of the Immunity Act, 
under the Restatement and under Tiede. Utah law does not require the higher showing 
that Mr. Giese intended to harm Ms. Wagner, or that he knew and appreciated that risk. 
B. Plaintiffs Rely on an Incorrect Intent Standard. 
The Tiede intent standard is dispositive of this issue. Appellants include the Tiede 
case in their brief, yet pay Tiede lip service and ignore its precedent that the intent 
required is the intent to cause contact, not harm.4 Instead, appellants ask this Court to 
4
 Plaintiffs5 assertion, however, seems inconsistent with their Complaint which 
asserts that Mr. Giese "acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily injury to" Tracy 
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apply a standard requiring an intent to cause harm and argue that a trial court needs to 
undertake a factual inquiry in every case to make such a determination. Such a standard, 
however, is not supported by Tiede or the Restatement, and should not apply here. 
In support, plaintiffs rely principally on Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 
1980), a non-Immunity Act case, that was not cited by this Court in Tiede or in any other 
of this Court's published decisions. In Matheson, a student threw a tootsie pop from a 
second story window and hit a school maintenance man in the head. The issue was 
whether that conduct constituted an intentional act (governed by a one-year statute of 
limitations) or a negligent/reckless act (governed by a four-years statute of limitations.) 
To make that determination, this Court held that an actor commits an intentional tort if he 
acts with an "intent to harm" or if his actions create a "substantial certainty that harm will 
result from the act." Id. at 322. The Matheson Court held that because that case involved 
an adolescent prank, defendants' actions may have constituted "reckless misconduct" 
negligence, but not "willful misconduct, such as assault and battery." Id.5 
The court of appeals below addressed and distinguished Matheson in two ways. 
First, Matheson did not involve a determination under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) of 
the Immunity Act. Second, the court of appeals stated that while this Court held that the 
Wagner. (R.4,18.) 
5
 Notably, the Restatement holds just the opposite. "[T]he fact that the defendant 
who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another does so as a practical joke, does not 
render him immune from liability so long as the other has not consented." Restatement 
(2d) Torts, § 13, comment c. 
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benign facts in Matheson (involving an adolescent prank) did not meet the requisite intent 
standard, the episode here did because Mr. Giese's violent actions directed at Ms. Wagner 
"created a 'substantial certainty that harm would result5 when he acted violently." Id. at \ 
7 (citing Matheson, 619 P.2d at 322.) In other words, the court of appeals held that the 
actions here met the higher standard that seemed to be recognized in Matheson, and thus 
constituted a battery under any definition. 
Defendants submit that Matheson is not applicable, and can be distinguished on 
either of these grounds. Certainly, when addressing a claim under the Immunity Act, the 
rule expressed in Tiede, a 1996 Immunity Act case, should take precedence over the 24 
year-old rule expressed in Matheson, a non-Immunity Act case, which has never been 
followed by this Court. There are, however, other reasons for this Court to reject 
Matheson's intent standard in favor of the Restatement standard. 
First, while the Restatement standard is a reliable statement of the law, Matheson 
is not. For example, Matheson relied on Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 118 P.2d 465 
(Cal. 1941), a claim arising out of a railroad collision, which distinguished between acts 
that were committed i) negligently, i.e., without any intent, ii) with wanton or reckless 
misconduct, i.e., with an intent to perform the act, and iii) with willful misconduct, i.e., 
with an intent to harm. Matheson, 619 P.2d at 322. Matheson recognized this division, 
but held that intentional torts were synonymous with "willful misconduct." Id. (The 
Restatement standard would place intentional torts in the middle group.) Matheson's 
position, however, is inconsistent with Utah law. This Court has recognized that "willful 
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misconduct" requires both intentionally tortious conduct plus an intent to harm. E.g., 
Brown v. Frandsen, 426 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1967) ("Wilful misconduct is the 
intentional doing of an act, or intentional failure to do an act, with knowledge that serious 
injury is a probable result." Emphasis added.) This Court should abandon Matheson and 
maintain a distinction between acts that constitute intentional torts, and those that rise to 
the level of willful misconduct. 
The Matheson Court also stated that the "gravamen of an assault and battery is the 
actor's intention to inflict injury" and cited three cases for support. Id. at 322. Those 
three cases, however, do not support that rule of law, but rather support the Restatement 
standard. In fact, Matheson cited, O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 440 P.2d 823 (Wash. 1968), and 
parenthetically cited the following: "An act cannot however, be considered a battery 
unless the actor intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person." 
Matheson, 619 P.2d at 322, n. 1 (citing O 'Donoghue, 440 P.2d at 827.) This is the 
Restatement standard, and does not support a standard based on an intent to inflict harm 
or injury as Matheson suggests. 
Matheson also cites two Kansas cases, Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 388 
P.2d 824 (Kan. 1964), and Hackenberger v. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co., 62 P.2d 545 (Kan. 
1936), where the courts held that plaintiffs had pled a negligence claim, not an intentional 
tort claim, and thus applied the longer statute of limitations. In each, the court recognized 
the Restatement standard. Hackenberger, cited the Restatement, and held that to be 
"intentional" the "act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact. . ." 62 P.2d at 
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547 (emphasis added.) Stricklin, like Matheson, involved a pi actical joke, and, altl lough 
the court did not rule that a battery occurred, it referenced the Restatement rule 
supporting that when a person plays a practical joke on another and "unintentionally 
caused •"** -names inflicted," he "takes the risk that his victim may not appreciate the 
humor of his conduct, but that does not relieve him from liability." 388 F ?d at X ?{) 
(citing Restatement Torts § 13.) 
Despite recognizing the Restatement standard - requiring an intent to make 
contact, albeit a harmful <u offrnsiw amtac I Miii/nt,ton and 11»• • cases nil *\hirh \\ irhrs, 
all misconstrued the Restatement and held that assault or battery requires an intent to 
inflict injury. The Matheson holding was not supported by the precedent on which it 
H/ticd I lir ( Vital '.liuiild lake this uppoilmuty h>< Ian(\ thai I In: l< csliilrnu.-iil s statement 
of the law is the correct one. 
Moreover, the law from Matheson reflects bad public policy. It allows a person 
who engages in ii ltentioi lal coi itac t to ai oid liability ior the consequence < : a*-* oi her 
actions. The rule espoused by plaintiffs would exclude not onl> i i lentall) r incompetei it 
persons from this analysis, but also persons under the influence, or persons who argue 
1;
 itw they never intended to cause the harm that resulted. If a person intentionally pushes 
another from behind with significant lour hv should not he able lo avoid liability bv 
arguing that while he intended to push him hard, he did not intend for him to fall down or 
fracture his back. 
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For this reason, the Restatement standard is more workable than the fact-intensive 
standard advocated by plaintiffs. Under a standard based on an intent to harm and an 
awareness of the impending harm, every case would involve a factual determination that 
would, in most circumstances, be difficult to resolve. The Restatement standard avoids 
that by requiring deliberate, as opposed to negligent, contact. This is especially important 
for cases involving the Immunity Act. The entire purpose of immunity is to allow 
immune parties to avoid spending time and money defending claims that the legislature 
deemed not in the public interest to pursue. The analysis advocated by plaintiffs would 
cause virtually every case involving assault or battery immunity to be fully litigated, 
thereby defeating the purpose of governmental immunity. 
For all of these reasons, the Court should continue to adhere to the Restatement 
section referenced in Tiede and should make clear that the rule from Matheson has fallen 
into disuse and should be disregarded. 
C. The Court of Appeals Did Not Remove Intent as an Element of Battery. 
Plaintiffs essentially argue that defendant advocated, and the court of appeals 
endorsed, a standard that removes the intent element from the analysis of assault and 
battery. To illustrate their position, plaintiffs set out three hypotheticals on page 13 of 
their Brief, in which there is physical touching due to an epileptic fit, a heart attack and a 
collapse from heatstroke. Aplt. Br. at 13. They argue that the court of appeals decision, 
and defendants' position, would result in each of these cases being deemed assaults 
thereby giving rise to immunity. 
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That is in iti i ic Defendants5 position, adopted b> tl le coi n t of appeals, does require 
intent. The intent required is an intent to make contact with another, distinguishing 
between contacts that are deliberate (such as the attack by Mr. Giese), and those that are 
accidental (such as all three of plaintiffs' hypotheticals.) These examples do not 
constitute batteries undt i Ihe ilefrndaiih. po^don IVlemlmits1 position lrjjimlm^ mlenl 
is reasonable and would not turn assault and battery immunity into a "catch all provision 
that precludes governmental liability for any scenario that involves a physical touching" 
as plaintiffs suggest. \pM Hi ,ni I \ » 1 I liulei the standard established in Tiede, and 
adopted by the court of appeals here, immunity will lie only for injuries arisiru 
deliberate attack. The contact here was neither involuntary nor accidental. Mi Giese 
violently grabbed Tracy Wagner by the hair and threw her to the ground I c o ^ This 
was no accident; the contact was deliberate. A ^ !
 ; i 1 
a battery occurred. 
D. Defendants' Position is Supported by Analogous Federal Case Law. 
The com t of appeals relied 01 i ai lalogc i is cases decided i indei the F sdei al 1 oi t 
Claims Act ("FTCA"), which has an exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994)), similar to 
section 63-30-10(2) of the Immunity Act, granting immunity for injuries arising out of 
assai ^ * *T"vries. 
In Miele v. United States, 800 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986), a plaintiff brought suit under 
the FTCA for injuries that arose out of an assault and battery committed by a person who 
was adjudicated m ne insane. Despite plaintiffs argument that the assailant's mental 
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capacity prevented him from being "capable of forming the intent necessary to commit an 
assault," (id. at 52) the court upheld immunity because "the question of whether the 
injury was perpetrated deliberately or accidentally does not depend on the employee's 
sanity." Id.6 The court concluded: "[tjherefore, the § 2680(h) exception to the waiver of 
sovereign immunity applies." Id. at 53. See also Spaulding v. United States, 621 F. 
Supp. 1150, 1154 (D. Me. 1985) ("a party presenting a claim arising out of an assault and 
battery may not avoid the subsection 2680(h) statutory exclusion for intentional torts by 
establishing that the assailant lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite intent, even 
where, as here, the assailant was found not guilty of the criminal assault charge by reason 
of insanity"). 
Although the court of appeals relied on Miele and Spaulding, plaintiffs do not 
address those cases, and instead cite two older FTCA cases. In the first, Gibson v. United 
States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972), the court, with little analysis of existing law, 
concluded that a jury should decide the issue of mental state to determine if the effects of 
narcotics deprived the assailant of "control of his mental powers" when he "plunge[d] a 
screwdriver into Gibson's temple." Id. at 1396. In Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp 
34, 38 (E.D. Term. 1976), the court applied Tennessee common law and, relying on 
6
 Miele referenced a 1985 U. S. Supreme Court decision, which stated that § 
2680(h) applies to bar claims arising out of "deliberate attacks." Miele, 800 F.2d at 52 
(citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985)). 
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in oi Gibson, held that the assailant's "mental derangement" prevented a niinii' as a inatd 
law. 
Unlike the courts in Gibson and Moffitt, the courts in both Miele and Spaulding 
reviewed i1--- '-*\v relating ;- -ie issue of intent and concluded that n lental state is 
irrelevant to that determination. In fact, the Spaulding court was critical of the Gibson 
and Moffitt decisions, and demonstrated that those cases were "inconsistent with 
controlling precedent and the history of the FTCA." Spaulding, 621 F Supp. at 1153. 
The Miele and Spaulding cases are bettei reasoi led ai id ai € coi isistei it "\ s ' ill i It! ic 
Restatement view. Like this Court's decisions in Higgins, they both support that the 
actions in this case constitute a battery, despite the mental incompetence of the assailant.7 
These FTCA cases offer fi ir tl lei si ippoi I i CM defei idai its' position tl lat the l i lental 
competence of an assailant is legally irrelevant to a determination of whether a battery 
occurred. 
7
 Plaintiffs also cite Mann v. Fairbourn, 366 P.2d 603 (Utah 1961), in which a 
negligence claim was to be asserted against a child. The Court held that a factual inquiry 
was necessary to determine if the child "failed to exercise that degree of care that is 
usually exercised by persons of [similar attributes.]" Id. at 606 That issue has nothing to 
do with this case, where the issue is not whether Giese acted with the requisite degree of 
care, but rather whether his conduct was intentional under Restatement § 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
According to plaintiffs' Complaint, this case arises out of an incident in which a 
State patient "became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the head and hair, and threw her 
to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily injury to her" 
(R 4, TI 8.) This incident was a deliberate attack on the plaintiff, and constitutes a battery 
under Tiede and the Restatement. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to immunity 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
For these reasons, defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the court of 
appeals' decision holding defendants immune and dismissing this case with prejudice. 
REQUEST RE: ORAL ARGUMENT 
Respondents hereby request oral argument. 
Dated this fa I day of November, 2004. 
BARRyG. LAWRENCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
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